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Jacques Rancière and Critical Theory 
Introduction 
Adam Burgos  
Bucknell University 
For all of the popularity and critical analysis that Jacques Rancière’s work 
has received in English over the last two decades, including several edited 
volumes and journal special issues, there has been less discussion than one 
might have thought about the relationship between his work and Frankfurt 
School critical theory. The 2016 English publication of the 2009 encounter and 
discussion between Rancière and Axel Honneth clarified that relationship to 
some degree, and also provides us with a variety of entry points for expanding 
on Rancière’s disparate remarks over the years about Frankfurt School 
thinkers.1 In her introductory essay to that volume, Katia Genel outlines two 
distinct strands of critical theory in the twentieth century: the more narrow (yet 
nonetheless complex) Frankfurt School tradition running from Horkheimer 
and Adorno, through Habermas and Honneth, to Rahel Jaeggi; and the 
broader critical tradition more evident in France, Italy, and the United States, 
embodied by different fields of critical area studies and neo-Marxist thought.2 
Rancière’s work has been much discussed in the context of the latter milieu, 
but relatively little in the former, though there are of course exceptions.3 This 
special issue of the Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy seeks to 
build on this recent work, which points us in exciting new directions for 
scholarship that engages themes central to both Rancière and the German 
tradition of critical theory. 
At the outset it is worth explaining why one might we think it worthwhile 
that Rancière’s work and that of the Frankfurt School be brought into further 
critical and productive contact. At a general level, there is significant overlap 
of conceptual concern between them, much of which will be explored in the 
essays in this special issue. That concern includes the goal of emancipation, 
intellectual and otherwise, as well as the critical evaluation of contemporary 
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society, including understanding that society within the context of modernity. 
More specifically, in one way or another, at the heart of both Rancière’s 
writings and that of the Frankfurt School thinkers is the conviction that history 
is key to understanding concepts, their meanings, and their functions.  
There are, however, clear differences between the two approaches that 
indicate to some extent why there has not been more engagement. Rancière’s 
response to the forces of history is to insist on finding the many ways that they 
have been resisted, reshaped, undone, and transformed. His archival work in 
Proletarian Nights is an early example of this career-long search, illustrating 
how nineteenth-century French workers sought to reimagine themselves 
against a backdrop of what appeared as the immovable reality of their work 
lives.4 Politics, for Rancière, does just that—takes social formations that 
present themselves as historical givens and intervenes to disrupt their fullness.  
In contrast, early Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno and 
Horkheimer can sometimes appear to interpret modernity as wielding such an 
all-encompassing influence on us in the present that resistance is futile. This 
is certainly a disputable characterization, but it is one consistent with 
Rancière’s critiques of many philosophical figures across traditions, from 
Aristotle and Plato, to Marx, Althusser, and Bourdieu. Even though later 
Frankfurt School philosophers, such as Habermas and Honneth, actively resist 
what they see as a totalizing strain of thought in their forbears, their chosen 
direction is no closer to Rancière’s chosen methodology—they remain far too 
abstract and idealized. This leads to the most obvious difference, in that 
Rancière is clear about not wanting to author any kind of social or political 
theory. Much of his work is avowedly antitheoretical in the sense that, rather 
than abstract claims or ideas, he attempts to focus on specific contexts and 
their moments, drawing lessons from them that can be tested in other 
moments, but that are never guaranteed to function in the same way 
elsewhere. He has written that he sees his work as a series of interventions into 
specific political contexts, and has rejected the entire tradition and project of 
Western political philosophy due to its myriad attempts to impose order 
where there is none.5 These self-characterizations add up to what appears to 
be a statement of intent, namely, that he is “not a political philosopher.”6 It 
seems clear that Rancière is rejecting the label of philosopher while at the 
same time not denying that he is a political thinker. Indeed, it is his particular 
way of understanding “politics” that stands at the center of much of his work. 
These fault lines between the Rancière and the iterations of the Frankfurt 
School are ripe for interrogation and analysis, and the five essays published in 
this volume, along with an interview with Rancière himself, capitalize on the 
opportunities provided by other recent work. The first three essays by Seth 
Mayer, Michael Feola, and Danielle Petherbridge stage a confrontation 
between Rancière and specific Frankfurt School thinkers. The final two shift 
gears to ask questions about the meaning of critical theory more broadly and 
Rancière’s potential relationship to it. Opening the issue is a pair of essays 
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analyzing the relationship between Rancière and Jürgen Habermas. Though 
Rancière does in fact explicitly engage with the Frankfurt School tradition in 
several moments in his work, it is often to contrast his work on the logic of 
disagreement with Habermas’s political philosophy. Central to Rancière’s work 
is a rejection of the political value of consensus, which he replaces with 
dissensus, which has made Habermas’s consensus-themed work on 
democracy an obvious foil. This strategy on Rancière’s part invites us to ask, is 
the disagreement between them as stark as Rancière would have it? Though 
disagreement is foundational for his understanding of politics, Rancière aims 
to outline scenes of communication and disagreement that yield new political 
situations and new political subjects. What can Habermas’s employment of the 
transcendental and the ideal speech situation tell us about Rancière’s political 
subjects? More specifically, do we find any rules implicit in scenes of politics 
that would lend Habermasian insight to Rancière’s thought?  
Seth Mayer’s essay takes up these questions in order to defend Habermas 
against Rancière’s charge that the former’s philosophy of communicative 
rationality and consensus lacks radical bite, arguing that the Habermasian 
framework of language, disagreement, and democracy can account for the 
types of political ruptures Rancière outlines. The result is a more radical 
reading of Habermas than Rancière allows. Mayer positions third-person 
speech as the hinge of disagreement between the two philosophers. 
Specifically, he makes the case that Habermas can in fact make sense of “the 
dynamics of command, exclusion, resistance, and aesthetic transformation” so 
important to Rancière. At the heart of Mayer’s defense is the Habermasian 
idea that there is no way to get completely outside of our lifeworld, and so the 
only way to critique it is from within. 
Rancière seems to offer a challenge to this idea when he describes politics 
as an interruption of the prevailing structure of society. At stake in the 
disagreement between Habmermas and Rancière on this point is the status of 
Rancièrean politics and what exactly it attempts. If it can successfully be 
described in Habermasian terms, then perhaps Rancière’s critique of 
Habermas is less successful than he believes. Mayer’s essay therefore proposes 
a challenge for Rancière and his supporters that is worth responding to. 
Following Mayer, Michael Feola outlines how Rancière and Habermas 
begin from a similar starting point but end up with very different ideas about 
the relationship between politics and speech. Rejecting a Habermasian model 
of political speech focused on consensus, Feola instead endorses Rancière’s 
“excess of words” in order to articulate a view of democratic political agency. 
At stake here is, in Feola’s words, “the normative term of universality.” Rancière 
understands politics and political actors as unable to lay absolute claim to any 
universalism, which puts him at odds with Habermas’ universal conception of 
rationality. Feola uses this differentiation between Rancière and Habermas to 
ground an investigation into the possibilities for speaking citizenship. He 
writes, “At stake is not simply who can speak in the idiom of citizenship, but 
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rather the linguistic resources that can contribute to a politics of equality.” 
Seen from this angle, Feola argues that Rancière is better positioned to answer 
questions about how to think about access to more equal speech in 
circumstances of inequality and unequal power. 
With this confrontation between Rancière and Habermas in view, Danielle 
Petherbridge turns our attention to the next generation of Frankfurt School 
thinking, contrasting Rancière and Axel Honneth through the lens of 
recognition alongside Judith Butler, who has her own intriguing relationship 
to the German tradition of critical theory. In part, Petherbridge argues that 
Rancière’s politics of subjectivization can be understood in terms of 
recognizability, a term she understands as crystallizing a series of problems 
surrounding the processes that either enable or disable recognition. 
Recognizability is linked to perception and how it structures our lived 
experiences and through which various elements of our surroundings become 
visible to us—or not. As such, recognizability exists at a stage prior to 
normative acts of recognition. Petherbridge examines how Butler, Honneth, 
and Rancière each offer their own set of relations between recognition, 
perception, and recognizability. The remainder of her argument, accordingly, 
asserts that Rancière’s conception of recognizability has room for the 
possibility for the disruption of domination in a way that Butler’s and 
Honneth’s do not. 
Shifting from particular disagreements to more general issues 
surrounding Rancière’s place in our understanding of critical philosophy, 
Alison Ross analyzes the relationship between leisure, reverie, and 
emancipation in Rancière’s work. Emancipation has long been central to 
Frankfurt School thought, marking a point of convergence with Rancière. Ross 
examines this convergence by asking just what constitutes emancipation for 
Rancière. Going back to Aristotle, the distinction between leisure and work has 
been key to understanding freedom. Marxism’s understanding of alienation, 
and the emancipation that would overcome it, is likewise rooted in the 
dichotomy between leisure and work. And Rancière has certainly focused 
much of his scholarship on workers and the time they spent doing things other 
than working, with Proletarian Nights being the most famous example. 
The protagonists of that work spend their time dreaming of and, 
importantly, enacting lives other than that of the worker, which might seem to 
mark Rancière as a theorist of leisure. But, as Ross argues, this would be a 
mistake. For rather than think within in the distinction between work and 
leisure, in which each is necessary for the other to be understood, Rancière 
invokes reverie—the power to do nothing at all—as a state of emancipation. 
Ross argues that such an understanding of reverie undercuts the work/leisure 
distinction altogether but does not exhaust the possibilities for emancipation 
for Rancière. Alongside reverie is emancipation as an act of will, the intellectual 
emancipation of The Ignorant Schoolmaster, which is a certain kind of practice. 
These two forms of emancipation, one grounded in the will and the other 
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defined by its absence, are nonetheless connected insofar as they are both 
understood as communicable experiences. In offering such a theory of 
Rancièrean emancipation, Ross illustrates an aspect of Rancière’s work that 
sets him apart from the critical theory tradition. 
In the issue’s final essay, we arrive at a fundamental question that 
underlies the entire problematic of an encounter between Rancière and critical 
theory, namely, what is a “critical” theory? Both Rancière and the Frankfurt 
School philosophers analyze contemporary society, diagnosing its ills. As we 
survey the contemporary world and the potential of these thinkers to 
illuminate it for us, we might ask ourselves how we should understand the 
“critical” aspects of their work. Rancière often denies that he has any theories 
at all, while Adorno is well known for his retreat to abstract theory. How should 
we take Rancière’s disavowals? Is there a more robust theoretical apparatus 
underlying his corpus that draws him closer to the Frankfurt School’s 
methodology, or are his specific interventions and historical examples enough 
to provide the critical edge he seeks? 
Matthew Lampert identifies what he views as the central tenets of 
Frankfurt School critical theory in order to ask whether or not Rancière’s 
philosophy might live up to the name. In arguing that the two are ultimately 
mutually exclusive he simultaneously shows how, even though Rancière would 
reject the essential components of critical theory, the latter nonetheless can 
mount a productive critique of his work. The result is a powerful gesture 
toward a Rancièrean critical theory that lives up to the spirit of Rancière’s work 
while also managing to capture its shortcomings. Lampert mines Rancière’s 
work in order to find a compatible place within it for the contributions of the 
social sciences as well as reorienting the concept of emancipation along the 
lines of the critical self-reflection of the theorist, retaining a core concept of 
critical theory without running afoul of Rancière’s insistence on the agency of 
the oppressed. 
Lastly, we present an interview recently conducted with Rancière on his 
relationship with Adorno, appearing in English for the first time here. 
Conducted by Andrea Allerkamp, Katia Genel, and Mariem Hazmoune, the 
interview concerns Rancière’s relationship with Adorno’s aesthetics. The 
interviewers’ questions and prompts provide Rancière with the opportunity to 
both distance himself from Adorno in a number of ways as well as to clarify 
his own views on aesthetics. Most pointedly, Rancière marks his own path off 
from Adorno’s by noting that the latter is uninterested in a collective politics 
of the oppressed. The interview’s wide-ranging topics, from literature, poetry, 
and music to the functioning of the dialectic and the possibilities for 
emancipation, serve as an apt culmination of this special issue. The fault lines 
that Rancière draws between himself and Adorno complement the readings 
of his relationship to the Frankfurt School in the preceding essays, as well as 
prompt further inquiry into how to understand Rancière in historical context. 
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Emancipation and critique, recognition and recognizability, speech and 
disagreement in politics—each of these concepts calls us to seek out the 
contours of Rancière’s work alongside that of the Frankfurt School tradition of 
critical theory. The essays and interview collected here illustrate some of the 
different ways that these concepts intersect through this array of thinkers. 
Other terrain is left to be traversed. Accordingly, I want to end here by 
gesturing toward some additional ways that the relationship between Rancière 
and critical theory might be taken up and issue a call to philosophers working 
on both to do so. 
Perhaps Rancière’s most well-known contribution to philosophical 
discourse is his idea of the distribution/sharing of the sensible (le Partage du 
sensible). Both art and politics are aesthetic insofar as they order our senses 
and how we understand and feel the world around us. From Horkeimer and 
Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry, to Benjamin’s interpretation of our 
aesthetic categories, and Adorno’s final grand work on aesthetic theory, the 
Frankfurt School has scrutinized the connections between aesthetic 
production and our social world. How does Rancière’s notion of the sensible 
critique or modify those approaches? Is his idea of the world exhausted by the 
split between art and politics as distributors of the sensible, or do Frankfurt 
School thinkers modify his social calculus? Lastly, which methodology allows 
us to approach art criticism in order to better understand our social world? 
Rancière gestures toward the possibilities for such engagement in the 
interview included here.  
 Finally, writings on ideology and ideology critique have seen a 
resurgence in the last decade, both within the paradigm of critical theory and 
without. This trend has brought together philosophers from different 
traditions, such as Rahel Jaeggi, Karen Ng, Sally Haslanger, and Jason Stanley, 
among many others.7 Oddly, though, Rancière has not been taken up in these 
discussions. While ideology in the traditional sense is left unspoken by 
Rancière he does, in my view, transform and redeploy the concept. It seems to 
me that in his understanding of politics as the articulation of a wrong by the 
“part that has no part,” which unmasks contradictions in the self-
understanding of the ruling class, we get much of the same structure as in 
more traditional philosophical discussions of ideology and ideology critique. 
The primary conceptual motor has shifted from freedom to equality, but some 
form of internal critique and the unmasking of contradictions remains. How 
significantly can the Rancièrean notion of “politics” be understood as a form 
of ideology critique? Both are deployed in the service of removing domination, 
so how close does Rancière’s view of equality come to the sort of freedom 
envisaged by more traditional theorists of ideology? 
 The work presented here pushes us, even after all that has been written 
about Rancière, to think of his work in new contexts. It also hopefully sets the 
groundwork for a new set of discussions of his conception of politics, as the 
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world around us calls for disruptions and interventions day after day in the 
name of equality and against the reinforcement of the status quo. 
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